




This essay responds to “Money as Art: The Form, the Material, and 
Capital” by the Marxist economist Costas Lapavitsas with refer-
ence to the triple manifestation of crisis in the United States dur-
ing the spring months of 2020. By triangulating the role of money 
in the COVID-19 pandemic, the ensuing mass unemployment, 
and the historical nationwide revolt in response to the police mur-
der of George Floyd predicated on a counterfeit twenty-dollar bill, 
Nicholas Huber makes a three-part claim. First, that acceptance of 
the Marxist theory of fetishism forecloses the possibility of conceiv-
ing of capitalist money as art in the sense developed by Lapavitsas, 
insofar as the latter tends toward transhistorical concepts of both 
art and money. Following from this, any aesthetic function of mon-
ey in the capitalist mode of production is inseparable from its total 
social function; that is, capitalist money is at once an economic, 
political, cultural, and aesthetic mediation unlike any other. Finally, 
Huber draws on Louis Marin’s typology of the frame in correspond-
ence with Erik Olin Wright’s integrated class analytic framework to 
argue that the question of whether money is art or not leads us to a 
dead end. Huber suggests that a crisis such as the one unfolding in 
2020 raises instead the more challenging question of what social 
system must come into being, such that a theory of capitalist money 
as art becomes intelligible.
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I scream to the stars at night
“Please give me money.”1
COST/BENEFIT
On May 25, 2020, nine minutes of cell phone footage documenting 
the death of a black man named George Floyd went viral soon 
after its recording.2 In the footage, Floyd’s neck is pinned under 
the knee of a Minneapolis police officer. Floyd pleads with the 
officer to let him breathe; the white officer does not. Not long 
after the video circulated, so too did a story. Floyd had written 
a bad check—or perhaps was a forger in a more active sense—and 
it was this that led the police to first confront and then execute 
him on the street. Later, this narrative was revised: the staff of a 
corner store called the police because they suspected Floyd had 
used a counterfeit twenty-dollar bill to buy cigarettes. In this 
version,3 the cost-benefit analysis of the police squad is explicit: 
Floyd’s life was valued at or less than twenty dollars and thereby 
exchanged.
Was it the recognition of this vicious calculation—its 
familiarity and the familiar inexpensiveness of a pretext for a 
police lynching—that charged the weeks of American revolt and 
international solidarity protest afterward? Certainly, George 
Floyd’s murder is overdetermined; certainly, Floyd’s death on 
the street is bound up in a co-constituting history of race and 
property. Does the footage then document, in just a few moments, 
so many aspects of a system of quantifying and trading human 
life that moves from chattel slavery, the fullest reification of 
humans as property, through the procedures of the workplace—
waged, salaried, bartered, or otherwise—and into the so-called 
“daily life” of interpersonal sociality conditioned by the flows of 
cash and the adjudication of one’s credit worth? Perhaps it is that 
in George Floyd we recognize a fate of one who is determined to 
owe, the indebted, and the attempted subsumption of life under a 
single axiom: pay up or die, of which only the second option was 
offered by the deputies of political economic order on the scene. 
Still more obvious is the resonance of Floyd’s last words, “I can’t 
breathe”—an echo of Manuel Ellis, Derrick Scott, Eric Garner and 
many others—in the midst of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, its twin 
artificial scarcities of income and ventilators, which had already 
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by May 25 left tens of thousands of Americans, the black and poor 
first among them, unable to breathe. 
As event, as visual media, and as textual narrative, the murder 
of George Floyd again obliterates any fantasy, so central to the 
liberal vision of bourgeois democratic society, of an aesthetic 
realm of privileged sense experience autonomous from the social 
relations institutionalized by capitalist money.4 An even greater 
shock to the senses soon followed, as proletarians in response to 
the murder first took control of Minneapolis’s third police precinct 
and then torched it, razing to the ground a heavily guarded and 
ideologically sanctified locus of domination, a site from which 
the guarantees of their exploitation had been coordinated and 
managed. Such a connection has not been lost in the subsequent 
weeks, as the centrality of police force as a capitalist institution 
became distilled in the demand to “defund the police,” a slogan that 
deliberately seeks to redirect the general logic of “death by money 
troubles” so familiar to the working class and proletarianized. 
Such a call is notable in that it attempts to translate a much older, 
fundamentally social demand to abolish the police into more 
narrowly economic terms.5 Add to this the widely circulated 
prediction that Amazon’s Jeff Bezos will become history’s first 
trillionaire by 2026 and the discovery that the pandemic has so 
far been enormously profitable for “high-net-worth individuals”: 
the shocks of spring 2020 have been registered at each moment in 
terms of money. 
The claim explored in the following sections, articulated as a 
response to the essay “Money as Art” by the Marxist economist 
Costas Lapavitsas, is that if capitalist money has any aesthetic 
character at all, any art-function, this follows as a function of its 
role as the means by which the boundaries of living and dying 
are arranged in the capitalist mode of production. As in Floyd’s 
murder, it is money that everywhere sets the terms of possibility 
in the sensuous world.6 Such a reality, however, does not make 
capitalist money a “public utility” even where it is employed with 
“universal” intentions, any more than it makes money “immediately 
art,” as Lapavitsas asserts.7 Capitalist money is the frame by 
which the sensuous life activity of subjects is rendered visible, 
legible, sensible in terms proper to the mode of production; it is 
a historical discovery that both poses and answers the question 
at the root of the aesthetic, the Kantian problematic of how sense 
activity can have anything to do with what surrounds it. The most 
provocative implication of this claim is that the category of the 
aesthetic as such is predicated on class violence of all forms—the 
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“otherization” mechanisms of destitution, dispossession, racism, 
gender and body essentialism, and the classic Kantian Orientalism 
serve as useful examples here, but no less so the “surplus labor 
stock” suddenly so visible between the months of April and 
June—a condition that bounds the physical dispensation of the 
material world and our experience as part of it. 
MONEY AS ART?
In “Money as Art: The Form, the Material, and Capital,” 
Lapavitsas starts from Walter Benjamin’s “throwaway remark 
that coin is a work of art […] whose aura has been subjected to 
the destructive influence of mechanical reproduction since the 
depths of historical time.”8 Lapavitsas launches from this claim 
into reflection on Benjamin’s primary object of thought, ancient 
Greek coinage, about which Lapavitsas says that for “anyone who 
has walked in the Numismatic Museum of Athens could not but 
concur” that the “sense of being in the presence of art is immediate 
and gripping.”9 This art effect, he continues, is not a result of any 
individual coin but rather the experience of them in large number 
and in variety of type. And while Lapavitsas deems important 
both the material of their construction and “the delicacy of the 
silverwork”—both traces of labor, the one of extraction and the 
other of inscription—it is the awareness by the viewer, he claims, 
of the coins’ ancient “moneyness” that grounds the aesthetic 
experience as an encounter with art:
Yet when the observer is aware of the objects’ ancient 
‘moneyness’, their power to connote ideas and sentiments 
becomes enormous. It follows immediately that the artistic 
aspect of Greek coins, which Benjamin took for granted, is 
rooted in their ‘moneyness’, while the beauty of the images 
and of the material is of secondary importance. Their artistic 
content is easier to apprehend in large sets which make it 
easier for the collective ‘moneyness’ of coins to appear as a 
tangible social and historical fact. […] Because the observer 
is aware of ‘moneyness’ even two millennia later, the coins 
are capable of symbolizing the perception that Greek city-
states had of themselves, thereby constructing a picture of the 
Hellenic world as a whole…10 
For Lapavitsas, “moneyness” in these pages takes on a curiously 
transhistorical quality. As he moves from ancient Greek coinage 
to the artistic dimension that must, he argues, present itself in 
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the “moneyness” of “bank accounts, cheques, and electronic 
money” as well as “a herd of cattle” as seen “in the eyes of the 
Nuer,” Lapavitsas draws out a theory of social relationality, an 
ontology of money that will be familiar to observers of the debates 
on the sociology of money.11 The exposition carries along with 
it, however, an image of “moneyness” as anachrony, a force out 
of and against time, upon which history can make its mark only 
by formal variation: “[money] remains the universal equivalent 
or the independent form of value” and as such “contemporary 
money is a truly ancient form of art, an instance of the original 
unity of the artistic and other functions when art was inseparable 
from the multiple purposes of its object.”12
What seems missing here is the somewhat obvious realization 
that the experience of “moneyness” in the Numismatic Museum 
is undoubtedly conditioned both by the context of curation and 
exhibition of the coins as artifacts, as well as by the fact that 
ancient Greek coins cannot pass current: they are dead media. 
Whether the modern invention of the art-function of readymades 
and found art provides the precondition for Lapavitsas’s account, 
it seems clear that a case for money as art relies on a neutralization 
of the money object’s ability to function as the universal equivalent 
in an analogous vein. Joseph Beuys, J. S. G. Boggs, and others 
have readily, if inadvertently, demonstrated precisely this fact: 
that while functioning money cannot be “commodified” the way 
that art can, counterfeit or defaced money is cleaved from the 
function of universal equivalent and functions as commodity in 
the same way that art or “artifact” might. The latter can never 
again be “monetized”—it is circulated, bought and sold, held as an 
asset, or destroyed. Heaping confusion upon itself, Lapavitsas’s 
assertion that “money remains the universal equivalent” appears, 
here, both as a tautology—universal equivalency being the 
defining characteristic of “moneyness,” the quality by which 
one recognizes money as money—and a category error insofar 
as Lapavitsas himself recombines the concept of “moneyness” 
with that of “money.” This elision is meant to establish historical 
duration as a kind of monetary substitute for Benjamin’s “aura,” 
which Lapavitsas agrees is lacking in money, but instead makes 
the case for the indispensability of historicization and, at 
minimum for Marxists like Lapavitsas and myself, a concept 
of “money” or “moneyness” specific to the capitalist mode of 
production. The anemic, anti-dialectical statement that “gold is 
directly money and hence it is directly art” exemplifies the dead 
end of this schema.13
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Nevertheless, Lapavitsas in his reading of Benjamin points us to 
an interesting and enduring set of problems about the relationship 
between two representational systems of value—monetary 
and aesthetic—that, in the modern period following the mass 
commodification of humans and the continued mass valuation of 
their artificing capacity in terms of money, are conceptualized 
routinely as the other’s opposite. It is human labor, necessarily, 
that binds money and the aesthetic in this contradiction, the 
supposed “purposelessness” of an artwork serving to demonstrate 
the crude utilitarianism of labor for which money is its immediate 
purpose or vice-versa, depending on the moment and one’s moral, 
ethical, and political investments. And it is with this contradictory 
tension in mind that we can return to our case study of the event 
of spring 2020, now with our attention moved to the context of 
Floyd’s execution on suspicion of his use of “moneyness” without 
the “money” in its historically necessary sense. By the end of May, 
the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic and its hallmark concepts, “essential 
workers” and “essential services,” had already been naturalized 
in public discourse. These concepts are instructive precisely 
for their explicit disavowal of “the aesthetic” as inessential—art 
exhibits, sport, and public performances are among the most 
notable prohibitions—while exemplifying, nevertheless, the 
reduction of social life in compliance with an economized image 
of public health. 
ESSENTIAL WORK
The introduction to USAID’s “Leadership During a Pandemic: 
What Your Municipality Can Do” begins with the invitation 
to “IMAGINE…”, interpellating an audience that can evidently 
engage the world in no way if not through the genre of didactic 
role play.14 You are a mayor, the text reads, and an “influenza 
pandemic” has breached your municipality’s borders. The second 
paragraph provides the proper mise en scene:
The Ministry of Commerce reports that due to the impact of the 
pandemic in other parts of the world, imports have declined 
by 20%. Crowds of people are out in the streets, buying up 
food and water and other essentials. A supermarket owner has 
posted security outside the store and locked the door with a 
chain. People are now very worried about how to survive the 
pandemic—and if they survive, running out of food and money.15 
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Never mind, for the moment, the trope of the chained supermarket 
which has not materialized during the pandemic, as well as the 
folksy notion that its “owner” is in close physical proximity, 
let alone a single human being. We will leave aside entirely the 
incoherence of crowds “buying up food and water” from these 
chained supermarkets, likewise the dog whistles to those looking 
for smoking guns “in other parts of the world.” The moral of this 
play is, instead, signaled by the slippage from “buying up food and 
water and other essentials”—in which money is only the means of 
acquiring such “essentials”—to “running out of food and money,” 
in which money has become a site of essentiality itself, alongside 
food and displacing water. Water becomes money: where the old 
saviors metamorphosed water into wine, ours can only imagine 
a basic sale.
This document of the contemporary and its correlative 
economic, political, and social crises—the context into which the 
event of the George Floyd revolts exploded—transmutes an old 
set of problematics: is money means or ends, the veil or the veiled, 
intermediary or the thing itself? Later, in “Tool 16: Maintenance 
of Essential Services,” the document unpacks the concept of 
“essential services” that has circulated so broadly in recent months 
with a list of examples, the last of which are “banking,” “payroll 
departments,” and “tax collection.”16 Each of these seems to be 
of a qualitatively different order than other services listed, such 
as “basic sanitation,” “healthcare,” “provision of clean water.” 
The former set speaks to the social mediation of human needs 
through the historically determined institutions of an economic 
system in a way that sanitation, healthcare, food, and water do 
not. Indeed, the list takes on a different character entirely when 
banking, payroll, and taxation are removed. In other words, by 
the inclusion of these in its essential categorization scheme, the 
document emphasizes that there will be no lawful “provision of 
food and other essential goods” to those without the money for its 
exchange. Even in a state of exception, American capitalism can 
no longer abide a breach in its “essential” relationship between 
work, money, and the means of subsistence. 
Is it possible to abstract from this instance a more general 
principle of applied “essentiality” in the capitalist mode of 
production? Perhaps this problem was already articulated in the 
language of fetishism: wherever and whenever money is deemed 
“essential,” its role as universal equivalent guarantees that its 
particular essentiality renders all other essentials only secondarily 
essential. Here, we can return to the anxious fantasy of the chained 
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supermarket, where it is now clear that its particular narrative 
threat emanates both from the sequestration and hoarding of 
food as well as from the neutralization of the universal equivalent, 
the money fetish, now just so much text, paper, and petroleum 
product—so much “moneyness.” The language of fetishism 
speaks to the animation of the money object as a quasi-religious 
artifact that requires the continuous enactment of certain rituals—
shopping of course, but also more proximate actions such as 
accounts balancing and debt reckonings, and labor of all sorts—
out of which the general shape of human life activity in a money 
society is formed. What the novel coronavirus pandemic and its 
texts make clear, once again, is that the “essence” of money in the 
capitalist mode of production is to set the limit and boundary of 
life’s arrangements. While money can and has been approached, 
in all its forms, as an interesting aesthetic object in itself (for 
which Lapavitsas’s treatment serves as instance, above), I would 
suggest that it is exactly by attending to the medium specificity 
of money, the entirely unique set of social contradictions that 
no other medium but money incarnates and manages, that the 
aesthetic properties which are exclusive to capitalist money could 
be perceived as wholly integrated with and mutually dependent 
on its so-called “economic” or “political” properties. 
With reference to the concept of the frame rather than the art 
object as such, I sketch in the next section one such approach in 
which the aesthetic is immanent within the total social force of 
capitalist money, its unique ability to set the terms by which life is 
arranged, experienced, narrated, interpreted. A theory of money 
that can demonstrate the simultaneity of the aesthetic with the 
political-economic is the only possible response to the challenge 
of medium specificity that does not slip into a disavowal of the 
aesthetic as epiphenomenal or “merely cultural” or, conversely, 
into an aestheticized rehearsal of fetishism. George Floyd’s 
execution for a “counterfeit” money is a brutal case-study of this 
necessary relationality. Like Lapavitsas, though with an evidently 
different set of priorities, I believe that with respect to monetary 
phenomena in the capitalist mode of production, such a theory 
of money is enabled by a Marxist research program insofar as it 
directs us to money’s role in managing the outer limits of historical 
possibility as well as the fissures and fusions throughout the 
social body.
MONEY AS FRAME
In a well-known essay, Louis Marin picked through the historical 
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derivations of the French, Italian, and English terms for the 
artistic frame—cadre, cornice, and frame, respectively.17 Claiming 
that “the three languages seem to cooperate in exchanging the 
same words and significations to sketch in the problematics of 
the frame,”18 Marin’s typology of framing poses cadre as “the 
border of wood or other material within which one places a 
painting”19 while cornice, on the other hand, is an adoption of 
“an architectural term: the projection that extends outward around 
a building to protect the base from rain; a protruding molding 
that crowns all sorts of works.”20 The primary analogies I wish 
to draw with money are here already, in the tension between: 
first, border or limit or container, second, a “superstructural” 
overhang designed to mitigate harm to a foundation, and, finally, 
a crown—as in, an ostentatious display of concentrated power or 
significance. Marin adds to this typology the etymology of the 
English “frame,” which 
points instead to a structural element in the construction of 
a painting, the latter being understood less as representation 
or image than as canvas. A frame is a stretcher that extends 
the canvas so it will be suited for receiving pigments. 
Rather than an edge of a border, rather than an ornament 
for a painting’s outer limits, it is the sub-structure of the 
support mechanism and of the surface of representation.21 
The echo of Marx’s classic base and superstructure metaphor is 
easy to hear in this segment, and it is in the tensions between the 
cadre, cornice, and frame types that their application to thinking 
money is richest and most useful. Above, money was associated 
with the “superstructural” cornice, while here, with the English 
“frame,” its position would seem to shift to one resembling the 
“base” of rolling stock Marx had in mind: a precondition for 
perceived phenomena; in his case, the “train” of historical social 
development, in Marin’s case, the pigmented canvas, and in ours, 
the real life activity of the bearers of capitalist money forms. The 
problem then is not one of discriminating amongst the aspects of 
these analogies for the most correct—is money more the base or 
the superstructure, more like a boundary or an ornamentation, 
etc.—and, in fact, the analogy could ultimately be left aside. The 
problem is one of the medium specificity of capitalist money 
and its peculiar social affordances which nevertheless do set 
the terms of lived experience in a manner similar to Marin’s 
conceptualization of the frame’s relationship to the painting. A 
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few more brief examples from the 2020 crisis may help to clarify 
this problem.
In just over two months in the first half of the year, over forty 
million people in the United States filed for unemployment 
as “non-essential” businesses were closed for social distancing 
and “non-essential” workers were moved to teleworking where 
feasible or otherwise furloughed or laid off. That number is the 
official estimate given by the Labor Department and therefore 
is qualified substantially. The real unemployment figure, due to 
underreporting, under-filing, and so forth, is inevitably higher. 
Contrary to the USAID’s toolkit, the chains were placed not on 
the point of consumption but on the point of production, on the 
sites where most of us must exchange our ability to work in hopes 
of receiving a paycheck two-to-eight weeks in the future. This 
has manifested not only in layoffs but also in hiring freezes, 
furloughs, cuts to hours, and other forms of labor drawdown. 
But in a system like this, in which the universal equivalent serves 
also as a universal mediation, as a barrier that sets people at a 
distance from the things that they need, such an arrangement is 
characterized not by the stagnancy of the “lockdown” but instead, 
by a dynamic standoff. 
The character of this standoff is conditioned, on one hand, by 
the circulation of the money supply and the ability or willingness 
of capitalists and state bureaucrats to reroute money around its 
central access point, the employment system.22 The operative 
question here is under what conditions is this necessary, and 
under what conditions can surplus “labor stock” be written off 
as collateral damage. On the other hand, the surplus labor stock 
itself, distinguished from other forms of capital stock by its ability 
to act and even cooperate, finds ways to circumvent or challenge 
this bind, whether through extralegal means such as petty theft 
or by continuing to work, which also now sets them against the 
proviso of law. The banner raised by the latter is familiar and 
familiarly loaded: if I can’t work who will feed my family?23 
The demands issued in response to this situation have typically 
followed one of two monetary logics: either that the state can and 
should issue money directly to everyone in order to back consumer 
spending (or at least debt and rent servicing) and thereby protect 
in some broad sense the social compact of reproduction; or, that 
this is impossible or morally negligent and that the only possible 
solution is to release the terms of lockdown in a tacit admission 
that “essential work” is a much more capacious category than 
documents like USAID Toolkit allow. Within each of these 
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demands is crystalized a whole social imagination, indeed, a 
different understanding of money in its frame function. Each was 
partially met and partially denied in the US context, the first in the 
form of a small, one-time direct consumer subsidy accompanied 
by a typically self-congratulatory letter from the US president. 
The second logic—represented early on by Dan Patrick’s public 
articulation of the death drive of economic liberalism, the will 
to die and sacrifice others for the good of The Economy24—
manifested in more dire forms.25
While the above conditions apply for “non-essential” workers, 
the situation for those designated essential workers is quite 
different, as this new conceptual category of labor has been forced 
to bear the weight of the work-money relationship in novel ways. 
For many, the mandate is simple: to get money, you must risk 
contraction during pandemic at the work site. The unavailability 
to these “essential workers” of the already meager unemployment 
benefits on offer in the US served to ensure that work remained the 
only source of reliable income.26 It goes without saying that the 
so-called essential character of these jobs—stocking supermarket 
shelves, for instance—did little or nothing to affect wages, with 
few exceptions, before or during the pandemic and, as such, these 
workers could not draw on money reserves that would allow them 
to risk being fired in order to wait out the pandemic. Once more 
the mandate: “pay up or die trying.” Nevertheless, many essential 
workers, recognizing the trap set for them as individuals, began 
to act cooperatively not only in the workplace but set against it, 
raising demands for personal protective equipment, hazard pay, 
and other basic compensations through rallies, demonstrations, 
and strikes. Where strikes were successfully organized, one 
reserve of labor, this one stocked in prison cells, was sometimes 
brought under threat of force to substitute the other.27 Meanwhile, 
it has been widely reported that the ultra-rich28 have only become 
ultra-richer during the pandemic,29 which cast an urgent and 
macabre light on research demonstrating that rich Americans are 
more likely to live longer than poor, published only a few months 
prior.30
It may be that to approach capitalist money as the frame of 
life is in some sense simply to confront the politico-aesthetic 
theory of biopolitics with its abjured economic dimension. In 
a critique of Bruno Latour’s reading of the pandemic, Joshua 
Clover glossed this confrontation by rewriting the biopolitical 
formulation of social logic as “always a ratio of make work and let 
buy,” within which the famous “make live and let die” is “simply 
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a tool among others.”31 What Clover’s reformulation suggests is 
the way in which aestheticized existential categories, such as life 
and death, are made to obscure the monetary logic that serves as 
the precondition for their sensibility within the capitalist mode 
of production. The frame of money conditions our experience of 
and exposure to such “universals,” but the quantitative dimension 
of “moneyness” ensures an image of non-universality: such is the 
fractiousness of class society. 
Variously and at different levels of social abstraction, the 
distribution and reproduction of money reserves condition 
powerful categories of the social, such as sex, gender, age, ability, 
and especially race. Erik Olin Wright’s summary of the three 
major approaches to sociological class analysis is instructive here. 
Borrowing an extended metaphor from Alford and Friedland, 
Wright schematizes the total social system and all its interlocking 
elements, all its interactions, as a game. As such, Durkheim-
inflected “individual-attributes” approaches conceptualize class 
at the level of potential and actual moves within the game, the 
Weberian “opportunity-hoarding” approach defines class at the 
level of the rules of game and contests over them, while the most 
abstract level and therefore the most immediately contentious—the 
Marxist approach that emphasizes domination and exploitation—
conceptualizes class at the level of the game itself, the persistent 
conflict over the question: what game are we playing and should 
we play another?32 
Perhaps with the deliberate intention of destroying these 
analogies under too heavy an interpretive load, I would suggest 
that each of Marin’s frame-types casts some light on the 
functionality of money within one of Wright’s levels. At the level 
where class is all about individual choices (moves made in the 
game), money functions like the French cadre, a border that boxes 
in otherwise roving and restless aspirations but not in a relational 
sense: here, the smallness of the frame in which you must live, 
your misfortune, appears solely yours, disconnected from the 
apparent good fortune of others, the largeness of their experience. 
At this level, there is no visible relation between a George Floyd 
and a Jeff Bezos; the limits of their life activity are simply subject 
to two quantitatively different but ostensibly independent frame-
functions. The opportunity-hoarding level (rules of the game) 
bears some resemblance to the Italian cornice, where various actors 
struggle to maintain greater protections for the integrity of their 
own structural position. Money is not the only means by which 
they do so—education, as in the first level, remains important but 
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so do other social licenses and permissions such as citizenship—
but perhaps the primary one insofar as it allows access to all the 
others, given the right circumstances. The demands for direct 
payment or for the end to lockdown are articulated from within this 
level as a function of the perceived interests of groups occupying 
different positions in the social milieu, positions closely related 
to the methods by which they access money. Finally, the Marxist 
level again brings us to another kind of image altogether: that 
of sensuous life stretched across the structure of the Frame, the 
mode of production as such, for which capitalist money plays an 
important role in managing an enormous group of people whose 
material interests lie in playing a different kind of game entirely. 
Here the class question is posed not in terms of money but in 
terms of a history of social violence—inside which money is a 
kind of found object appropriated from prior historical moments 
for class purposes, becoming specifically capitalist money with 
all its capacities for hoarding, dispossession, and the largeness of 
an aesthetic relation to “life” and “death” built on the exploitation 
of human labor, its conversion into the universal equivalent.
In any case, what I wish to add to Wright’s schema by 
introducing the concept of the frame is the way in which money as 
a classed material not only shoots across each level but, crucially, 
extends far beyond what we might denominate as the “economic” 
and “political” realms of the social and conditions aesthetic sense, 
access, and imagination in all manner of direct and indirect 
fashions. Which brings us to the familiar problem, also raised 
by Lapavitsas, of the relationship between money and ideology. 
On the one hand, money serves as the representational means 
by which the subject may adduce his contribution to abstract 
productivity, even if the income stream or reserve is not at all 
faithfully representative of such a relation and is characterized 
instead by the noise of and confusion of conflict. We could then 
argue that money is indeed a powerful medium of ideology in the 
Althusserian sense. On the other hand, even as money is necessarily 
representational in this sense, money is distinct as a medium. 
Unlike a figurative artwork—a painting, for example, or ancient 
coins in a museum—which may in its form and materials reflect 
the technical capacities of its artist’s historical, geographical, and 
social position, or by its content may deliberately or accidentally 
extrude cultural and political meanings of both the literal and 
symbolic types, capitalist money does not truck in metaphors: 
without money, subjects in the capitalist mode of production 
are literally and immediately nearer to death. Money is first and 
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foremost an object for acquisition and circulation and its physical 
aesthetic properties—the prints and images on its faces—can only 
be understood as inalienable from the aspects of social power. 
It has remained popular to imagine money as a kind of void—
indeed, to imagine all sorts of categories as voids. The problem 
with money is not that it is “nothing,”33 but that it is a special kind 
of nothing that confronts us at every turn. Our modernity has 
universalized the links between necessity, the money by which 
we procure necessities, and the work by which we procure money. 
These are the conditions of life and death. Such conditions can 
be overcome and, indeed, are regularly overcome by heirs and 
beneficiaries of money hoards which act as buffers to forestall 
the need to work. But anybody living is subject to the condition in 
the last instance; all human life activity is organized in reference 
to the frame. Increasingly, all non-human life activity is as well. 
Water takes the shape of its vessel; life in the capitalist mode of 
production takes the shape of money’s frame. As a frame, the 
form that money takes is necessarily bound to the technical 
capacities of a society and therefore to its historical dimensions. 
Money’s forms are indexical in this way: money is one site where 
“history becomes form” and the social relations of an order are 
institutionalized. 
FRAMED
One prominent feature of the protests and media mobilization 
following Floyd’s murder has been the proliferation of the slogan 
“defund the police,” sometimes offered in conjunction with the 
older “abolish the police” but usually as the latter’s replacement.34 
“That an explicitly abolitionist slogan would be displaced by 
one posed in stageist monetary terms precisely at the moment 
in which an actually existing police precinct is spectacularly 
abolished—eradicated, incinerated—requires explanation.”
At the very least, such a turn raises the question, again, of non- 
or anti-capitalist uses of capitalist money, especially when 
considered alongside the mass mobilization of fundraising to 
support victims of police violence and, in particular, protestors 
who had been jailed by police and held with bail. The call to 
defund the police has drawn attention to the enormous pools 
of money allocated to police in jurisdictions all across the 
US, and directed scrutiny to the disproportionality with which 
money flows to forces responsible for the management, control, 
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immiseration, and death of proletarians and not to services 
nominally responsible for life support, such as hospitals and 
other nodes of care.35 
The simultaneity of the unemployment crisis, a global 
pandemic, and the series of police executions of Black Americans 
including Breonna Taylor, Tony McDade, Sean Reed, Manuel Ellis 
as well as George Floyd brought this double bind of biopolitical 
organization into sharp relief. The demand to defund the police 
as well as demands for new terms of compensation—more secure 
employment, better pay, the regularization of direct government 
deposits to consumers, and so on—all rightly draw attention to 
the monetary dimension of this system in a way, as Clover argued, 
that theoretical approaches like that of biopolitics fail to. One 
could say the same for the mass mobilization of crowdsourced 
donations to bail funds in support of protestors jailed by police. 
At the same time, I would argue, such demands cannot help but 
demonstrate the agility of the monetary containment mechanism, 
the gravitational systemic force by which even abolitionist 
horizons are corralled back in seeming inevitability into 
negotiations with accountants. 
We dream in money, as surely as we live and die by its 
movements. The invitation to approach money as art that 
Lapavitsas raises must be read, against the situation of a class 
society whose signature institutions earmark whatever quantity 
for all-expenses-paid oppression, as a challenge to build the 
conditions under which the brutal force of capitalist money is 
inverted concomitantly with the subject position of its bearers. 
Angela Davis famously diagnosed the cul-de-sac of “imagining 
prisonlike substitutes for the prison,” and it is this kind of 
formalist/reformist solipsism that a Marxist theory of money—let 
alone any kind of materialist monetary program—must constantly 
guard against. It could be that humanity really does set itself only 
such tasks as it can solve and that we are already capable of such 
a total reimagination of money. Or we might find ourselves in 
a world in which something like Benjamin’s concept of the aura 
might apply to capitalist money forms, their moneyness now 
confronting us as anachronism alongside other relics on public 
display. Then again, perhaps it is not any modern notion of art 
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